




(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Benjamin Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 Harvard L. & Pol'y Rev.
375 (2007).
Published Version http://hlpronline.com/vol1no2/sachs.pdf
Accessed February 19, 2015 8:57:15 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10488716
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAALabor Law Renewal 
 
Benjamin I. Sachs∗ 
I. Introduction 
In 1935, the Seventy-third Congress of the United States established 
a rigorously centralized regime of labor law. With the National Labor Rela-
tions Act1 (NLRA), Congress moved to encompass all of American labor 
policy within a single federal statute to be interpreted, administered and 
enforced by a single federal agency. When it came to labor law’s core func-
tions—facilitating and regulating the self-organization of workers and the 
collective interactions between labor and management—there was to be a 
single legal channel: Neither other federal laws nor state or local legisla-
tion was to interfere with the dominance of the NLRA and its administra-
tive agency, the National Labor Relations Board.2 
Today, however, this centralized regime of labor law is no longer func-
tional. The current diagnosis points to two basic pathologies. First, and 
most fundamentally, the NLRA fails to protect workers’ ability to choose 
to organize and bargain collectively with their employers.3 Second, the 
NLRA is ill-ªtted to the contours of the contemporary economy, and in-
creasingly out of step with its demands.4 
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1
 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner-Connery Labor Relations Act), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151–169 (2000).  
2
 As originally enacted, the NLRA provided that the National Labor Relations Board’s 
(NLRB or “the Board”) power to develop and enforce labor policy was “exclusive,” and 
“shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may 
be established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise.” Ch. 372, § 10, 49 Stat. 453 (1935) 
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000)). 
3
 A study completed earlier this year suggests, for example, that one in ªve employees 
who takes an active role in organizing campaigns is discharged for doing so. See John 
Schmitt & Ben Zipperer, Dropping the Ax: Illegal Firings During Union Election Cam-
paigns (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/unions_2007_ 
01.pdf.  
4
 For example, since the time of the Act’s passage, U.S. ªrms have restructured production 
systems and rethought human resource models. While the new business models are varied 
and multi-layered, the NLRA now appears mismatched to nearly all of them. See, e.g., 
Katherine V. W. Stone, From Widgets to Digits: Employment Regulation for the 
Changing Workplace (2004). The statutory regime also has proven remarkably inept in 
responding to changes in the composition of the U.S. labor force, and now entirely excludes 
from its coverage contingent workers, “knowledge” workers, and undocumented immigrant 376  Harvard Law & Policy Review  [Vol. 1 
Despite the statute’s failings, however, and despite dramatic trans-
formations in the U.S. economy and labor force, the NLRA has remained 
essentially unchanged for more than half a century.5 This statutory stag-
nation has, in turn, produced a scholarly consensus that federal labor law 
is not simply dysfunctional but also peculiarly resistant to the reinvention 
it so clearly needs.6 The explanations for this rigidity, moreover, seem 
inseparable from the decades-old decision regarding centralization. Thus, 
according to this now conventional account, by centering American labor 
law in a single federal statute, giving exclusive enforcement powers to a 
single federal agency, and depriving individuals and state and local gov-
ernments of the ability to drive innovation, Congress has insulated labor 
law from the traditional avenues of rejuvenation and reform. 
And yet, while the NLRA has indeed failed at both facilitating col-
lective action and keeping pace with changes in the economy, neither the 
statutory scheme nor Congress’s unwillingness to amend it has prevented 
a reordering of labor law. To the contrary, the ªeld is beginning the proc-
ess of reinvention, and the conventional wisdom regarding labor law’s dor-
mancy is no longer tenable.7 In this Essay, I brieºy sketch three examples 
to illustrate labor law’s new dynamism. The ªrst concerns the ability of 
several thousand janitors in the South to secure wage increases and health 
beneªts through a unionization campaign governed entirely by private 
agreements. The second involves the unionization of several hundred thou-
sand home care and child care workers under a labor law regime devel-
oped by state governments. And the third is the story of an immigrant 
garment worker who, relying on a quintessential employment law statute 
and without the involvement of a traditional labor union, led a collective 
effort to secure overtime wages at her Brooklyn garment factory. 
As these three stories exemplify, and as I elaborate in a forthcoming 
article,8 labor law is being reinvented through a process that I call the “hy-
 
                                                                                                                              
workers, precisely those segments of the workforce that increasingly deªne the labor mar-
ket. 
5
 It is currently a priority of the AFL-CIO and Change to Win labor federations to se-
cure passage of a host of labor law reforms, including the Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 
800, 110th Cong. (2007), which recently was passed by the House of Representatives. See 
Steven Greenhouse, House Passes Top Priority of Unions, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 2007, at 
A14; Steven Greenhouse, Labor Presses for Measure To Ease Unionizing, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 8, 2006, at A28. The report of the Committee on Education and Labor is also now 
available. See H.R. Rep. No. 110-23 (2007). 
6
 See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Reºections on Group Action and the Law of the Work-
place, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1563 (1996); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossiªcation of American Labor 
Law, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1527 (2002); Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: 
Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 59 (1993); Paul 
C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization under the 
NLRA, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1769 (1983). 
7
 Professor Estlund, in writing about the “ossiªcation” of American labor law, pre-
dicted that ossiªcation would set in motion processes of de-ossiªcation. See Estlund, supra 
note 6, at 1609.  
8
 See Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law: A New Paradigm for Collec-2007]  Labor Law Renewal  377 
draulic demand for collective action.” That is, the NLRA’s failings have 
left the traditional legal channel for collective action blocked, but this block-
age has not dissipated the demand for organization.
9 Unable to ªnd ex-
pression through the NLRA, the pressure from this continuing demand 
for collective action has forced its way out through three new legal chan-
nels. No longer a regime deªned by a single federal statute administered 
by a single federal agency, American labor law is increasingly constituted 
by private processes, by state and local regulation, and by multiple fed-
eral statutes enforced by multiple actors. 
I propose, moreover, that each of these three decentralizing trends 
constitutes a form of experimentation with the optimal way to restructure 
American labor law. The ªrst is an inquiry into the appropriate function 
of private agreement in labor law; the second an investigation of the role 
that states and localities should play in the design of labor policy; and the 
third an exploration of whether a legal regime that offers strong protec-
tion for the most nascent phases of workers’ organizing activity, but leaves 
outside of law’s domain further organizational development and labor-
management interaction, is an adequate—or even desirable—substitute for 
the NLRA. In the aggregate, and given a legal architecture capable of cap-
turing the results, these experiments promise both to help us resolve 
practical quandaries integral to labor law reform and to answer questions 
at the conceptual core of the ªeld. 
II.  Opting Out of the NLRA 
The NLRA statutorily guarantees employees the right to organize and 
act collectively for their mutual aid and protection and to bargain collec-
tively with employers through representatives of their own choosing.10 
But, as is well rehearsed in the literature, the NLRA rules governing or-
ganizing campaigns and the process of union recognition have failed to 
protect employees’ ability to choose collective representation.11 NLRA rules 
also “lock[ ] employers and unions into an unnecessarily adversarial pos-
ture before bargaining relationships can begin,”12 and thus hinder the de-
 
                                                                                                                              
tive Action (working title), 29 Cardozo L. Rev. (forthcoming 2008). 
9
 For example, one survey conducted in 2005 found that 57% of workers would vote 
for a union if they had the chance to do so. See Jonathan P. Hiatt & Craig Becker, At Age 
70, Should the Wagner Act Be Retired? A Response to Professor Dannin, 26 Berkeley J. 
Emp. & Lab. L. 293, 300–01 (2005) (citing Peter D. Hart Research Associates, The 
Public View of Unions (2005)). Economists Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers report 
that 87% of workers want some form of representation in the workplace. Richard B. 
Freeman & Joel Rogers, What Workers Want 147 (1999). 
10
 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). 
11
 See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 6, at 1778. In its report on the Employee Free Choice 
Act, the House Committee on Education and Labor reviewed much of this evidence and 
literature. See H.R. Rep. No. 110-23, at 19–21. As the Committee stated, “many employers 
insist on NLRB elections because they are a tool for killing an organizing drive.” Id. at 20.  
12
 Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening Up the 378  Harvard Law & Policy Review  [Vol. 1 
velopment among employees of the kind of “organizational citizenship 
behavior” that Professor Stone shows to be integral to contemporary work 
systems.13 
In response to these deep ºaws in the traditional regime, both unions 
and employers have begun to abandon the NLRA and the NLRB. Accord-
ing to the NLRB General Counsel’s Ofªce, in the last ten years the num-
ber of representation petitions ªled with the Board has dropped 41%,14 and 
between 1998 and 2003 less than 20% of the three million workers organ-
ized by AFL-CIO unions were organized through NLRB procedures.15 In-
stead, employers and unions increasingly are relying on privately negoti-
ated processes. Often (inaccurately) grouped together under the moniker 
of “neutrality and card check agreements,” these private agreements es-
tablish varied sets of ground rules governing unions’ and employers’ con-
duct during organizing campaigns, procedures for registering workers’ 
preferences on the question of collective representation, and mechanisms 
for resolving disputes. The recent organizing efforts of low-wage immi-
grant janitors in Houston are illustrative of this trend. In this Part, I pre-
sent a summary of that campaign and the private agreement that struc-
tured it. I then brieºy address the broader move toward private ordering 
in labor law, highlighting the ways in which these agreements depart from 
the traditional NLRA model. 
A.  Organizing the Houston Janitors 
At a time when national unionization rates have sunk to a post-war 
low of 12.5%, the unionization rate in Texas, 6.2%, is less than half the 
national ªgure.16 Indeed, Business Week commented earlier this year that 
Houston is a city where “unions are as scarce as caribou.”17 Until recent de-
velopments changed the situation, nonunion janitors who cleaned Hous-
ton’s commercial ofªce buildings made $5.25 per hour, and because most 
of the cleaners worked part time, a Houston janitor’s average weekly pay-
check was just over $100.18 These workers had no health coverage, no pen-
sion, and no paid days off.19 
 
                                                                                                                              
Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 827, 835 (1996). 
13
 Stone, supra note 4, at 94–99. 
14
 A representation petition is the mechanism used to invoke the Board’s election pro-
cedures. The number of these petitions dropped from 6179 to 3643. See NLRB Ofªce of 
General Counsel, NLRB General Counsel’s Report on FY 2006 Operations (2007) 
(cited in NLRB General Counsel’s Report Shows Large Drop in Election Petitions in FY 2006, 
Daily Lab. Rep., Jan. 5, 2007, at A10). 
15
 See James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Pros-
pects for Changing Paradigms, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 819, 828–29 (2005). 
16
 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members in 2006 
tbl.5 (2007), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.  
17
 Henry Maurer, A Union Victory, Bus. Wk., Dec. 12, 2005, at 32. 
18
 Steven Greenhouse, Union Claims Texas Victory with Janitors, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 
2005, at A1. Unionized janitors earn $11.90 per hour in New Jersey, $13.30 per hour in 2007]  Labor Law Renewal  379 
Convinced that a traditional organizing effort based around an NLRB 
election would be futile, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 
chose instead to structure its efforts to organize Houston’s janitors according 
to a private agreement with the city’s ªve major cleaning contractors.20 
Marking a radical departure from the traditional NLRA campaign, the 2005 
agreement obligated each contractor to “take a neutral stance” with re-
spect to the janitors’ decision regarding unionization and to recognize SEIU 
as the exclusive representative of its workers when a majority signed union 
authorization cards.21 For its part, the union agreed to refrain from any eco-
nomic action directed at the contractors during the organizing campaign.22 
Moreover, although the NLRA provides unions with the right to demand 
collective bargaining as soon as they organize a single employer, SEIU 
agreed to accept a novel “collective bargaining trigger.” Under the trigger, 
SEIU committed to delay bargaining with any employer until it succeeded in 
organizing a majority of the entire “Houston Area Market,” eliminating the 
possibility that a single ªrm’s competitiveness would be threatened by con-
tractual gains secured by the union.23 Finally, in order to allow their ap-
proach to take root, all parties agreed explicitly to refrain from invoking 
any of the NLRB’s rules or procedures and from ªling any petitions or 
charges with the Board.24 
By November 2005, the union had gathered authorization cards from 
a majority of the janitors at four of the signatory cleaning contractors.25 
Pursuant to the agreement, SEIU was recognized by the contractors as 
the union for 4700 Houston janitors, “one of the largest organizing suc-
cesses ever in the private sector in the South.”26 And in accordance with 
the trigger agreement, collective negotiations then began between SEIU 
and the contractors for a market-wide contract.27 Following a strike by the 
newly organized workers, the parties reached a three-year deal in No-
 
                                                                                                                              




 For a discussion of how the parties reached this agreement, see, for example, id.; see 
generally Brudney, supra note 15, at 835–40. 
21
 Neutrality Procedure Agreement Between SEIU Local 5 and Various Houston Jani-
torial Contractors [hereinafter Houston Janitors Agreement] ¶¶ 3.0, 3.1, 4.0, 4.1 (on ªle 
with Harvard Law & Policy Review). 
22
 Id. ¶ 10.0. 
23
 Id. ¶ 5.0. The market was deªned by the parties’ agreement. See id., app. a. For a 
discussion of trigger agreements, see generally Fred Feinstein, Renewing and Maintaining 
Union Vitality: New Approaches to Union Growth, 50 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 337, 343–44 
(2006). 
24
 Houston Janitors Agreement, supra note 21, ¶ 6.0. 
25
 Steven Greenhouse, Final Step in Janitor Unionization, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 2005, at 
A31. 
26
 Id. Eventually, workers at the ªfth contractor authorized union representation, bring-
ing the total number of janitors represented by SEIU to 5,300. Id.; see also Steven Green-
house, Cleaning Companies in Accord with Striking Houston Janitors, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
21, 2006, at A18 [hereinafter Cleaning Companies in Accord]. 
27
 There’s Money in Mopping, Economist, Dec. 10, 2005, at 87. 380  Harvard Law & Policy Review  [Vol. 1 
vember 2006 through which workers secured a nearly 50% increase in 
wages, individual and family health insurance (available as of January 
2009), and, for the ªrst time, paid vacation days.28 Because work shifts 
also will increase from four hours to six, employees’ paycheck amounts 
will double over the next two years.29 
B. Toward  Private  Ordering 
The Houston campaign illustrates a much larger movement—across 
unions, industries, and geography—to replace the federal legal regime’s 
rules for organizing and recognizing unions with privately negotiated 
ones. In 2004, for example, UNITE and HERE—the garment and hotel 
workers’ unions—reported that 85% of their new members were organ-
ized through private agreements with employers.30 Between 1998 and 2002, 
SEIU organized more than 100,000 private sector members through such 
compacts (while adding only 82,000 members through NLRB elections),31 
and in 2006 the union relied on private agreements in 100% of its cam-
paigns to organize janitors and security guards.32 Similarly, the United 
Auto Workers reports utilizing private agreements for a majority of its 
recent organizing work.33 Professors Brudney and Hartley, drawing on the 
work of Adrienne Eaton and Jill Kriesky, have described some of these 
developments,34 and recent Board decisions conªrm the continuing trend.35 
In some agreements, as in the Houston janitors case, the employer 
consents to exempt itself from the organizing process by remaining neu-
tral on the question of whether employees should choose collective rep-
resentation. But there is wide variation across these labor-management 
accords. Many agreements, for example, explicitly preserve the employer’s 
ability to express anti-union sentiments, and instead require only that both 
 
                                                                                                                              
28
 Brad Hem, Janitors Say They Are Ready To Walk, Houston Chron., Oct. 17, 2006, 
at 1; L.M. Sixel, Janitor Strike: “A Foothold Into the South,” Houston Chron., Nov. 14, 
2006, at 1.  
29
 See Cleaning Companies in Accord, supra note 26. 
30
 See Brudney, supra note 15, at 830 n.48. This includes, for example, tens of thou-
sands of Las Vegas casino workers organized by HERE through card-check recognition 
procedures. See Bureau of National Affairs, Card Check, Neutrality Accords Best Way for 
Unions To Organize, UNITE’s Raynor Says, 18 Lab. Rel. Wk. 811 (June 10, 2004) (cited 
in Brudney, supra note 15, at 830 n.48). 
31
 Brudney, supra note 15, at 830 n.48. 
32
 Service Employees International Union Research Department, 2006 Cam-
paigns (on ªle with Harvard Law & Policy Review). In this one year, the union added 
more than 12,000 janitors and security guards to its property services division through 
these agreements. Id. 
33
 Brudney, supra note 15, at 830 n.48. 
34
 Id.; Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition La-
bor Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 Berkeley J. Emp. & 
Lab. L. 369 (2001).  
35
 See, e.g., Dana Corporation (Dana I), 341 N.L.R.B. 1283 (2004); Dana Corporation 
(Dana II), 2005 NLRB LEXIS 174 (Apr. 11, 2005); Tenet Healthcare, 2005 NLRB GCM 
LEXIS 10 (Feb. 23, 2005). 2007]  Labor Law Renewal  381 
parties speak about unionization with some degree of factual accuracy. Al-
though these agreements do not require neutrality, they also depart from 
the NLRB’s approach, which is to avoid “prob[ing] into the truth or falsity 
of the parties’ campaign statements” and to leave election results undis-
turbed despite the widespread use of “misleading” speech.36 Private agree-
ments that do not require neutrality also often (again in contrast to the 
Board’s rule) tailor the conditions under which an employer may communi-
cate anti-union views in order to reduce the economically coercive poten-
tial inherent in such communication.37 
Privately negotiated organizing agreements also incorporate differing 
approaches to facilitating communication between union organizers and em-
ployees. For example, while the NLRA gives unions essentially no right to 
enter employer property to communicate with workers, many private agree-
ments give union organizers some limited right to gain access to workplaces, 
during certain times and in certain areas, in order to discuss unionization 
with workers.38 
Similarly, unions and employers have developed a range of mecha-
nisms for assessing employee choice on the question of collective repre-
sentation. The most well known and certainly the most oft-cited private 
recognition procedure is the “card check” or “majority sign-up” proce-
dure, according to which employees express their choice by signing, or not 
signing, a union authorization card. But unions and employers also con-
tract to establish private election procedures under which the union’s ma-
jority status is determined by a secret-ballot election conducted, not by 
the NLRB, but by a neutral third-party.39 
 
                                                                                                                              
36
 Midland National Life Insurance Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982). 
37
 The agreement between SEIU and Catholic Healthcare West is one leading example 
of this type of compact. The parties agreed that the employer could express opposition to 
unionization, but negotiated the speciªc message that the employer would convey to em-
ployees. The agreement also bound both sides to communicate “only that which is factual” 
and required the employer to express its views only through literature or group meetings—
management was prohibited from delivering anti-union messages during one-on-one meet-
ings with employees. SEIU v. St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 344 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2003). 
Moreover, while the employer was free to deliver its approved anti-union message in group 
meetings, the agreement forbade the employer from making attendance at such a meeting a 
condition of employment, something federal labor law entitled it to do. According to the 
parties’ agreement, employees who so desired had the opportunity to hear the employer’s 
opinion on the question of collective representation, but they could not be compelled to 
listen to employer speech on the subject. Id. The full agreement [hereinafter SEIU/Catholic 
Healthcare West Agreement] is on ªle with the Harvard Law & Policy Review. 
38
 See Brudney, supra note 15, at 826. For example, the SEIU/Catholic Healthcare 
West agreement gave “a reasonable number” of union organizers access to public areas 
inside the hospital for as long as organizers “conduct[ed] themselves in such a way that 
does not disturb patients or visitors.” SEIU/Catholic Healthcare West Agreement, supra 
note 37, ¶ II.E.6.b. The Houston janitors agreement, on the other hand, explicitly required 
the union to conduct all organizing activity away from the properties where the employees 
worked. Houston Janitors Agreement, supra note 21, ¶ 3.4. 
39
 See Tenet Healthcare, 2005 NLRB GCM LEXIS 10, at *14–*15. 382  Harvard Law & Policy Review  [Vol. 1 
In sum, unions and employers are opting out of the NLRA and rely-
ing instead on varied systems of self-regulation. As they do so, labor law 
is evolving from a centralized federal legal regime to one deªned increas-
ingly by private ordering. 
III.  State and Local Labor Law 
Part of the centralizing effect of the Wagner Act has been to locate 
labor policy ªrmly, and nearly exclusively, within the domain of the fed-
eral government. Federal preemption of state and local labor law has been 
robust. Thus, states and localities may not regulate any activity that is 
arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA, nor may they regulate con-
duct that Congress intended to be left to the “free play of economic 
forces.”40 
Federal labor law preemption has severely constrained and contorted 
state and local attempts to innovate in the ªeld of labor law.41 But the 
appropriate heaping of criticism on the preemption doctrine should not 
obscure the ways in which state and local governments are responding to 
critiques of the NLRA regime and, within the bounds allowed by the fed-
eral law, offering emerging alternatives. 
This trend is occurring primarily through two channels. First, by as-
suming the role of employer and collective bargaining partner for an ex-
panding set of “atypical” workers, states are creating new labor laws for 
workers excluded from NLRA coverage. Second, for employers who re-
ceive public funds, states and localities are constructing, and encouraging 
unions and employers to construct, alternative rules for the conduct of 
organizing campaigns and alternative processes for recognition. 
A.  The Public as Private: Home Care and Home-Based Child Care 
Workers and the Public Authority Model 
Home care workers assist their elderly and disabled clients with the 
activities of daily living—dressing, bathing, toileting, and eating—in their 
clients’ homes. Although precise ªgures are difªcult to obtain, estimates 
for the total number of home care workers in the United States range from 
700,000 to nearly 1.5 million.42 The Department of Labor, moreover, has 
 
                                                                                                                              
40
 Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 
427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976) (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)); 
see also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 240 (1959).  
41
 See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 6, at 1569–77. 
42
 The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates 700,000 home care workers. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor,  Personal and Home Care Aides (2006), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/pdf/ocos173.pdf. The Center for Personal Assistance 
Services at the University of California put the number at 1,001,464 in 2004. Univ. of 
Cal., San Francisco, Ctr. for Personal Assistance Services, Estimated Number of 
PAS Workers and Workers per Persons With Self-care Difªculty for All States 2007]  Labor Law Renewal  383 
identiªed home care work as one of the fastest growing sectors of the 
labor market.43 The great majority of home care workers are women and 
people of color, and most are able to secure only intermittent and part-
time employment.44 Despite being physically and emotionally demanding, 
the work is poorly compensated: in 2005, the mean annual wage for home 
care workers was $17,710, and health insurance, retirement, and related 
beneªts were extremely rare.45 
Much home care work is performed according to a traditional model 
in which workers are employed by private agencies, but a substantial and 
growing segment of the industry—perhaps one-third—consists of so-called 
“independent providers” of home care services (or “IPs”).46 While the 
employment status of IPs can vary according to the particular ways in which 
services are provided, these workers have been classiªed either as employ-
ees of the individual in whose home they work or as independent con-
tractors. Under either scenario, the ability of these “atypical” workers to 
unionize under the NLRA is constrained. First, the Act excludes from its 
coverage any individual employed “in the domestic service of any family 
or person at his home.”47 Second, the Act excludes those workers “having 
the status of an independent contractor.”48 The NLRA accordingly pro-
 
                                                                                                                              
(2004),  available at http://www.pascenter.org/state_based_stats/acs_workforce_all_2004. 
php?title=Number+of+Home+and+Personal+Care+Workers+by+State. SEIU, one of 
the U.S. labor unions engaged in organizing these workers, estimates that in 2003 there were 
1,408,039 home care workers in the United States. Service Employees International 
Union Research Department, Total Home care Workers List (2005) (on ªle with 
Harvard Law & Policy Review). 
43
 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Women’s Bureau, Facts on Working Women (2003), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/hotjobs03.htm; U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 2004-
2005 Occupational Outlook Handbook,  available at http://www.ocouha.com/cur/ooh 
030508_18.htm. 
44
 In 2005, BLS estimated that fully 85% of home care workers were women, 24% 
were African American, and 15% Latino. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t 
of Labor, 2005 Household Data Annual Averages tbl.11 (“Employed persons by 
detailed occupation, sex, race, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity”), available at http://www. 
bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.pdf. On the part-time nature of home care work, see Rhonda J. V. 
Montgomery, Lyn Holley, Jerome Deichert & Karl Kosloski, A Proªle of Home Care Workers 
from the 2000 Census: How It Changes What We Know, 45 Gerontologist 593, 599 
(2005) (“The proportion of year-round, full-time home care aides from the 2000 Census is 
only 34%.”). See also Linda Delp & Katie Quan, Homecare Worker Organizing in Califor-
nia: An Analysis of a Successful Strategy, 27 Lab. Stud. J. 1, 4 (2002) (“[M]ost [Califor-
nia home care] workers could not even ªnd 40 hours of work per week.”). 
45
 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, May 2005 National 
Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates (“Personal and Home Care Aides”), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes399021.htm; Delp & Quan, supra note 44, 
at 3; Peggie R. Smith, Organizing the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household Workers 
and Approaches to Employee Representation, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 45, 74 (2000). 
46
 Data on the numbers of IPs is scarce, and neither the U.S. Department of Labor nor 
the Center for Personal Assistance Services offers a speciªc estimate. SEIU conducted a 
national survey of states with independent provider programs, and determined that in 2003 
there were 478,000 IPs working in the U.S. (data on ªle with Harvard Law & Policy Re-
view). 
47
 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000). 
48
 Id. 384  Harvard Law & Policy Review  [Vol. 1 
vides these home care workers with little hope of coverage, leaving this 
large and growing sector of the labor force without protection from tradi-
tional labor law. 
The picture for home-based child care providers, who offer child care 
services in their own or their clients’ homes, is much the same. Estimates 
place the number of home-based child care workers at 1.8 million.49 Ac-
cording to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 94% of the child care work-
force in the United States is female, more than 30% is African American 
and Latino,50 and, again, the work is poorly compensated with beneªts 
essentially nonexistent.51 As with home care workers, home-based child 
care providers are without NLRA protection, primarily by virtue of the 
statute’s exclusion of independent contractors. 
Federal labor preemption doctrine, however, leaves states free to 
regulate the union activity and labor relations of workers and employers 
exempted from NLRA coverage. As such, the statute’s failure to provide 
labor law coverage for these workers leaves open the possibility for de-
velopment of state labor law to ªll the gap.52 California’s In-Home Sup-
portive Services (IHSS) system provides a leading example. 
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earnings of home-based child care workers range from $6,209 per year in New Mexico to 
$16,367 per year in Washington. See Chalªe et al., supra note 49, at 6. 
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 While the state laws I review here are novel—they offer protection to new kinds of 
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als in the Health Care Industry: A Reconsideration of NLRA Coverage of Housestaff, 19 
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Under IHSS, more than 200,000 IP home care workers provide in-
home services to nearly 400,000 elderly and disabled California resi-
dents.53 Workers receive their paychecks from the state comptroller, but 
workers are hired, supervised, and discharged by the individual client.54 
In a 1990 decision, a California court of appeals determined that the in-
dividual client—in whose home services are provided—is the IHSS home 
care worker’s only employer.55 The holding thus implied that these work-
ers would fall within the NLRA’s domestic service exclusion. Accord-
ingly, although thousands of low-wage workers in California were paid by 
the same state agency to perform the same work, the workers had no em-
ployer for NLRA purposes and no one with whom they might bargain col-
lectively over wages and working conditions.56 
The California legislature responded, ªrst by authorizing and then 
by requiring counties to establish a “public authority” (or other entity) to 
constitute an employer of the county’s IHSS home care workers.57 Under 
the California law, IHSS home care workers were authorized to organize, 
to elect a collective representative, and then to bargain collectively over 
wages and beneªts with the public authority of the county in which they 
work.58 The state legislation thus provided a protected right to organize 
and required counties to create an employer and collective bargaining 
partner for hundreds of thousands of low-wage workers previously excluded 
from labor law’s coverage. 
Similar state action has offered the beginnings of state labor law cover-
age to publicly ªnanced home care workers in Illinois,59 Massachusetts,60 
Michigan,61 Oregon,62 and Washington,63 and to home-based child care pro-
viders in Illinois,64 Iowa,65 Michigan,66 New Jersey,67 Oregon,68 Washing-
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56
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See id. 
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 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 12301.6, 12302.25 (West 2001). 
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 See id. § 12302.25 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 3500 (West 1995)). 
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 See 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. §§ 315/3 and 315/7 (West 2006); 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
Ann. § 2405/3 (West 2006). 
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 In Michigan, the state Department of Community Health entered into an intergov-
ernmental agreement with a multi-county ofªce on aging and created the Michigan Quality 
Community Care Council. The agreement is on ªle with the Harvard Law & Policy Re-
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 See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 410.600–410.614 (2005). 
63
 See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 74.39A.220–74.39A.300 (West 2002). 
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ton,69 and Wisconsin.70 In its most fully developed iterations, the model is 
consistent: through ballot initiative, executive action, and/or legislation, a 
public entity is created (or, alternatively, the state or an existing subdivi-
sion of the state is assigned this role) and becomes the employer of the 
workers for collective bargaining purposes.71 By law, the workers gain the 
right to organize and bargain collectively with the public authority over 
those terms and conditions of employment within the authority’s control, 
which primarily (and sometimes exclusively) are wages and beneªts.72 
Reºective of the nature of the services provided by home care work-
ers and home-based child care providers, decisions regarding the hiring, 
ªring, and supervision of workers are often reserved for the consumers of 
home care services and the families receiving child care services. Thus, such 
decisions may not be the subject of collective bargaining between work-
ers and the public authorities.73 Reºecting similar concerns, home care 
workers and home-based child care providers are prohibited by many of 
these state laws from striking.74 
The results of these state efforts to expand labor law coverage into 
sectors of the workforce excluded from the federal regime have been signiª-
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 See Iowa Exec. Order No. 45 (2006), available at http://publications.iowa.gov/archive/ 
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 See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 410.608 (2005); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 41.56.028 
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cant. In 1999, in the largest successful organizing drive since 1937, 74,000 
home care workers in Los Angeles unionized.75 And since 1999, more than 
300,000 home care workers and 130,000 home-based child care providers 
nationally have gained union representation through rights granted and 
procedures established by state law.76 With unionization, these workers have 
made impressive gains. In recent years, home care workers in Illinois se-
cured wage increases of 149%, in California 147%, and in Oregon 42%.77 
Illinois child care workers won a 35% wage increase over the ªrst three 
years of their new collective bargaining agreement.78 
B.  The Public as Public: State Neutrality Laws and Labor 
Peace Legislation 
By assuming the role of employer and collective bargaining partner 
for these atypical workers, state governments are stepping into the breach 
left by the NLRA’s exclusion of an expanding segment of the U.S. labor 
force. A second exception to federal labor preemption doctrine has left 
room for a second body of emerging state and local labor law. Namely, 
states and localities are subject to federal labor preemption only when 
they “regulate.” But when state and local governments act in their “pro-
prietary” capacity, they are freed from preemption scrutiny.79 Thus, through 
legislation aimed at employers who receive public funds or work on pub-
lic contracts, states and localities are also attempting to reorder the rules 
governing employer and union behavior during organizing campaigns. In 
some instances, these statutes directly deªne an alternative range of per-
missible and impermissible conduct. In other instances, the statutes man-
date that unions and employers reach a private accord that sets the rele-
vant parameters.80 
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Recent legislation in California and New York exempliªes the for-
mer type of state labor law, often characterized as “state neutrality laws.” 
81 California Assembly Bill 1889 (the “Cedillo Act”) prohibits employers 
who receive state funds from using those funds to “assist, promote, or 
deter union organizing.”82 Similarly, under New York Labor Law section 
211-a, no employer in the state who receives any state funds may use those 
funds to hire or pay contractors or employees to encourage or discourage 
union organization or participation.83 Although both laws apply only to 
employers who receive state funds, their impact is quite far reaching.84 
Through statutes like the Cedillo Act and section 211-a, states encour-
age—and for employers who receive a signiªcant proportion of their in-
come from state sources, strongly encourage—employer neutrality on the 
question of union representation. Another emerging body of state and 
local law does not itself impose rules for organizing, but rather requires 
covered employers—again the recipients of certain state funds or con-
tracts—to enter into agreements with unions that establish such alterna-
tive rules. These laws are generally classiªed as “labor peace” legislation, 
although there has been substantial variation in this body of state and local 
law as well. 
In 2000, for example, Milwaukee County enacted an ordinance appli-
cable to employers who contract with the county to provide transporta-
tion services for the elderly or persons with disabilities.85 Under the ordi-
nance, covered employers must enter into a “labor peace agreement” with 
any labor organization that seeks to represent its employees.86 The labor 
agreement must prohibit the union from engaging in an “economic ac-
tion” (including a strike, picket, or boycott) against the employer.87 While 
the ordinance does not require employer neutrality, it does require the 
labor-management agreement to prohibit the employer from expressing 
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false or misleading information relevant to the question of unionization 
and from compelling employees to attend meetings on the question of un-
ionization. The employer must also provide the union with a list of em-
ployees and grant the union reasonable access to the workplace.88 
The scope of the “proprietary” exception to federal labor preemption 
is disputed among the federal courts of appeals. Thus, a preemption chal-
lenge to New York’s section 211-a recently has been remanded to the dis-
trict court by the Second Circuit,89 while the Ninth Circuit’s en banc de-
cision upholding the Cedillo Act is now the subject of a petition for cer-
tiorari.90 Similarly, labor peace ordinances have been upheld against pre-
emption challenge by the Third Circuit and one Seventh Circuit panel,91 
while a different Seventh Circuit panel invalidated another such law.92 It 
is, accordingly, not unlikely that the Supreme Court will address this de-
bate soon. If it does so, the Court will help determine the continued vi-
ability of this form of labor law experimentalism. 
Despite the signiªcant, and currently evolving, restraints imposed by 
federal labor preemption doctrine on neutrality and labor peace legisla-
tion, state and local governments are driving labor law innovation through 
the two sets of laws outlined above. The result is evolution from a ªeld 
exclusively deªned by federal law to one that increasingly incorporates 
state and local regulation. 
IV.  Employment Law as Labor Law 
Although the National Labor Relations Act promises that workers, 
should they choose to do so, may organize and interact collectively with 
their employers, the statute’s deeply inadequate remedial regime has ren-
dered protections for associational and collective activity ineffectual and 
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produced “a culture of near-impunity . . . in much of U.S. labor law and 
practice.”93 
For example, while the NLRB has authority to order an employer to 
pay back wages to employees discharged in retaliation for engaging in pro-
tected collective activity, all such damages must be exclusively compen-
satory: No punitive awards are available.94 The Act does empower the Board 
to seek reinstatement of workers discharged for engaging in protected 
activity,95 but the endemic and massive delays that accompany such rein-
statement proceedings have rendered this a similarly insufªcient mecha-
nism for protecting employees engaged in collective action. For example, 
an employer can defeat an organizing drive by unlawfully discharging 
union supporters and keeping them out of the work force for a few weeks. 
But the median length of time from an employee’s ªling a charge alleg-
ing employer misconduct to the issuance of a ªnal Board decision is 
nearly two years.96 Finally, because the statute centralizes all enforcement 
power in the NLRB and denies workers a private right of action, the Board’s 
weak remedies and time consuming procedures are the only game in town. 
In response to these failures, academic observers repeatedly have pro-
posed changes to the NLRA regime that would enhance the remedies 
available to the NLRB, increase the availability and use of preliminary 
injunctions, and add a private right of action.97 Indeed, enhancing the reme-
dies available under the NLRA is a central component of the Employee 
Free Choice Act, currently pending in the U.S. Congress.98 
Recognizing these ºaws in the NLRA regime, but unwilling to con-
tinue waiting for Congress to heed calls for statutory reform, workers, un-
ions, and new forms of worker-organizations are turning to other federal 
statutes to protect their efforts at collective action. These actors are driv-
ing a disaggregation of labor law’s core function from the NLRA to other 
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statutory regimes, primarily employment laws like the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA) and Title VII, whose anti-retaliation provisions have 
the potential to offer vigorous protection for the nascent phases of organ-
izational activity.99 
The center of much of this disaggregating work has been New York 
City, home to hundreds of thousands of low-wage immigrant workers and 
to a number of nontraditional labor organizations known as “worker cen-
ters.”100 Bushwick, Brooklyn is home to one such center, Make the Road 
by Walking (MRBW),101 a membership organization dedicated to facili-
tating Bushwick workers’ efforts to collectively secure rights at work.102 
While a great majority of garment workers who are members of MRBW 
earn below minimum wage and close to 100% of these garment workers 
are not paid overtime wages, the rate of unionization among garment worker 
members of MRBW is approximately zero.103 Lacking union representa-
tion and facing rampant violations of their rights at work, garment work-
ers in Bushwick along with MRBW have been forced to develop alterna-
tive models of organizing and, concomitantly, novel legal mechanisms for 
protecting their organizing efforts. The 2001 campaign for unpaid over-
time wages at one Bushwick garment factory illustrates this development. 
 
* * * 
 
Danmar Finishing employs several hundred employees in the work of 
preparing garments for sale by New York’s clothing retailers. Although 
Danmar employees regularly worked more than forty hours per week sewing 
garments, they were never paid time-and-one-half their regular rate of pay, 
as required by the FLSA.104 In order to recover the overtime they were 
owed, and to compel Danmar to begin complying with the FLSA’s over-
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time requirements, Danmar employees initiated an organizing campaign 
through MRBW. The workers staged multiple pickets outside the factory, 
along with public demonstrations across New York City. The workers also 
engaged in a successful effort to publicize their campaign in New York’s 
Spanish and English language media. As the collective actions escalated 
and attracted increasing attention, the Danmar workers enlisted the sup-
port of local political leaders, including Congresswoman Nydia Ve-
lazquez and Senator Charles Schumer, who joined them on the picket line 
outside the Danmar factory gates.105 
Danmar responded to the workers’ collective campaign by retaliating 
against the lead organizer of the effort, a sewing machine operator named 
Maria Arriaga. Shortly after the workers’ organizing campaign began, Ar-
riaga’s weekly wages were cut and then, ªve days after the ªrst public 
demonstration by the Danmar workers, Arriaga was ªred. As she tells it: 
[R]ight before I left work, [manager] Don Carlos angrily yelled 
at me at the top of his voice. He shouted at me so everyone in 
the factory could hear him that, “Here in the factory, I am the 
boss. There is no law that can tell me what I have to do in my 
factory.” . . . He said that I was “stupid,” and “a piece of trash.” 
He told me that I was ªred and that I should go home.106 
Arriaga’s discharge threatened the continued efforts of the workers’ 
collective campaign. Although the NLRA makes retaliation for participa-
tion in collective action of this sort illegal, MRBW did not turn to the 
NLRB for relief. Rather, MRBW attorneys provided the U.S. Department 
of Labor (DOL) with a draft motion for a temporary restraining order based 
on the FLSA’s anti-retaliation clause. The motion argued that the Danmar 
workers’ organizing campaign was protected by the FLSA, and thus that 
the discharge of a worker who participated in collective action to secure 
overtime was retaliation made illegal by that statute. The motion sought 
Arriaga’s immediate reinstatement. 
Nine days after the DOL ªled the motion, Judge David Trager of the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York ordered Danmar 
to “offer immediate reinstatement of employment” to Arriaga.107 And with 
Arriaga back at work—nearly two years sooner than she would have been 
had she pursued relief under the NLRA—the Danmar employees’ efforts 
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to secure their wage and hour rights continued toward completion. In-
deed, in December 2003, Danmar agreed to pay more than $400,000 to 
workers whose overtime rights had been violated. In the end, the cam-
paign was described as an “historic triumph for a band of immigrant sweat-
shop laborers who challenged their boss.” The New York Daily News called 
Arriaga a “real-life counterpart to movie heroine Norma Rae,”108 and Eugene 
Scalia, Solicitor of Labor at the time, touted the “quick action” in the Ar-
riaga retaliation in his address to the ABA.109 
Of the three trends identiªed here, the turn to “employment law as 
labor law” is the most emergent and interstitial. It nonetheless constitutes 
an important iteration of the hydraulic effect: Unable to ªnd protection 
for their collective action in the NLRA, workers have begun to rely on 
alternative statutory regimes like the FLSA and Title VII. 
V.  Hydraulics, Decentralization, and 
Labor Law Experimentalism 
The three examples outlined here belie the conventional wisdom that 
labor law has reached a dead end. To the contrary, they highlight a proc-
ess of labor law reinvention driven by the “hydraulic demand for collec-
tive action.” That is, the legal channel for collective action designed by 
Congress in 1935 is, indeed, blocked. But the blockage of this traditional 
pathway has not, in any sense, ended the demand for organization and 
collective interaction.110 Unable to ªnd an outlet through the NLRA, the 
pressure from this continuing demand has forced open the three legal 
channels described in this Essay. 
This reconceptualization of the current state of labor law suggests a 
research agenda focused on these new channels for collective action, and 
on others that may be emerging. Although a full account is beyond the 
scope here, some preliminary observations are in order. In Section A be-
low, I brieºy review what these trends reveal about the current state of U.S. 
labor law, in particular its decentralization along the three axes I have 
noted above. I also propose that we treat these trends as experiments, and 
as pointing the way to an experimentalist approach to labor law reform. 
By doing so, we will be positioned to resolve the practical and structural 
questions that are at the core of the ªeld. In Section B, I highlight some 
of the broader conceptual and theoretical implications of these develop-
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ments, noting what we might learn from this discussion about democratic 
experimentalism, the private role in public governance, and the relation-
ship between individual rights and collective action. 
A.  A Decentralized and Experimentalist Approach: Practical and 
Structural Implications 
The opening of each of the three new legal channels I have described 
here constitutes a process of decentralization and disaggregation. Thus, 
as unions and employers replace the NLRA’s and NLRB’s procedures 
with privately negotiated processes better tailored to the demands of the 
contemporary economic order, labor law is evolving from a centralized 
legal regime to a dispersed system deªned increasingly by private agree-
ment. As state and local governments attempt—in the face of the NLRA’s 
aggressive preemption doctrine—to correct the failings of the federal 
statute, labor law is decentralizing from a regime deªned exclusively by 
federal law to one constituted by federal, state, and local regulation. And 
as workers turn to alternative federal statutes, including employment laws 
like the FLSA and Title VII, to protect their efforts at self-organization 
and collective action, labor law is disaggregating from a legal regime 
deªned by a single federal law enforced by a single federal agency to a 
regime constituted by multiple statutes enforced by multiple actors. 
I propose, moreover, that each of these three decentralized channels 
constitutes a distinct form of experimentation into the ways to restructure 
American labor law. Self-consciously embracing the experimental poten-
tial in these decentralizing trends promises enormous returns. To start, 
the experiments provide data on pressing practical questions about labor 
law that have long demanded new answers: how best to deªne the rules 
that govern behavior during organizing campaigns, determine the range 
of employees covered by labor law’s protections, resolve disputes between 
labor and management, and structure an effective remedial regime. 
The experimental developments outlined here also promise to allow 
us to resolve structural questions fundamental to labor law reform. As to 
these broader questions, an examination of state and local intervention into 
what has been an almost exclusively federal regime for seventy years allows 
us to grapple again with questions of federalism in the labor law context, 
particularly the extent to which and the ways in which state (and local) 
government should be involved in the development of labor law.111 Simi-
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larly, labor-management experimentation with privately negotiated orga-
nizing and recognition agreements will reveal a great deal about the ex-
tent to which it is desirable to structure labor policy exclusively around 
law and regulation and the extent to which private process and private 
agreement provide viable mechanisms for constructing that policy. 
We have, unfortunately, come to conceive of these two choices as bi-
nary ones; that is, as choices between federal and state or local law and 
between law and private orderings. In the federalism arena, the heavy hand 
of federal labor preemption doctrine inclines us to such a view. With re-
spect to private process, because employers and unions have turned to con-
tractual agreements out of a desire to avoid the NLRB’s regulations, 
these agreements are largely understood as a replacement for, and thus in 
conºict with, the regulatory regime. And because the current Board itself 
views private organizing and recognition agreements as a substitute for 
its own procedures and governance, it opposes their use and development.112 
Thus, the Board has indicated a desire to limit the ability of unions and 
employers to privately agree to any recognition process other than a Board-
conducted election113 and to limit the efªcacy of unions organized through 
such alternative processes.114 The Board has also begun to attack labor and 
management’s ability to reach agreement on organizing and recognition 
procedures by limiting what unions and employers may discuss prior to 
recognition.115 
But we are not limited to these binary choices, and this posture of con-
ºict obscures more nuanced possibilities. Indeed, rather than treating the 
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emerging body of state and local labor legislation as impermissibly in 
conºict with federal law, and rather than treating privately negotiated proc-
esses for organizing and recognizing unions as hostile to the federal regu-
latory regime, labor law could more productively facilitate and channel 
decentralization’s experimental potential. 
One approach to constructing a legal architecture capable of performing 
this role is a variant of what Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel term “de-
mocratic experimentalism.” Such a regime would call on the federal gov-
ernment to abandon the highly speciªed rules it imposes on unions and 
employers and instead to restate the goals of labor law “with sufªcient 
generality to accommodate reªnement through pursuit of effective solu-
tions.”116 Having stated the ends that labor law seeks to achieve, Congress 
would then authorize local actors—both public and private—to experiment 
with the means to achieve them. Within this experimentalist mode of la-
bor law, the NLRB would retain an important but fundamentally trans-
formed role. Rather than developing and implementing an essentially 
unitary set of rules for the entire U.S. labor market, the agency would be 
tasked with “creating the infrastructure of decentralized learning” and 
establishing “rolling best practices” that would constitute a ºoor below 
which states and private parties could not fall.117 
The third trend identiªed here—the disaggregation of labor law’s 
primary function from the NLRA to employment law statutes—constitutes a 
distinct form of experimentation and offers insight into another question 
at the structural core of labor law: whether a legal regime that offers 
strong protection for the nascent phases of workers’ organizational activ-
ity, but leaves outside of law’s domain organizational development and 
labor-management interaction, is a suitable replacement for the NLRA. 
In the Danmar example, the FLSA succeeded where the NLRA failed: It 
 
                                                                                                                              
116
 Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
ism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 342 (1998); see generally Michael W. McConnell, Federal-
ism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484 (1987). 
117
 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 116, at 345. That is, the Board would survey state and lo-
cal experiments, provide state and local actors with ready access to information about what 
their neighbors are doing, and deªne performance measures by which regimes can be evalu-
ated. Based on its analysis of extant experiments, the Board would promulgate rolling best-
practice rules that require regulated entities to “use processes that are at least as effective 
in achieving the regulatory objective as the best practice identiªed by the agency at any 
given time.” Id. at 345, 350. The continuing federal role in a democratic experimentalist 
approach to labor law—and particularly the requirement that state and local experiments 
adhere to (broad) federally established goals—would mitigate though not eliminate the 
potential “race to the bottom” dynamic identiªed above. See supra note 111. Such a fed-
eral role also would be broadly consistent with provisions in federal employment statutes 
that allow states and localities to offer employees greater—but not lesser—protections and 
remedies than are offered by the federal law. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 12201(b) (2000) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to invalidate or limit 
the remedies, rights, and procedures of any . . . law of any State or political subdivision . . . 
that provides greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities than 
are afforded by this chapter.”).  2007]  Labor Law Renewal  397 
provided Arriaga with a quick remedy for illegal discharge, thereby sav-
ing the organizing campaign. But once the ªrst phase of organizing is com-
plete—once the workers have collectively secured minimum wage and 
overtime pay—the FLSA (and other employment statutes like it) offers 
no legal protection at all. Nonetheless, recent research into the dynamics 
of reciprocity and collective efªcacy provides reason to believe that if initial 
attempts at collective action in the workplace are insulated from coercive 
employer interference, subsequent organizational development and stronger 
forms of collective action may be possible even absent additional legal 
guarantees.118 Accordingly, and given the NLRA’s multiple pathologies,119 
a federal labor law tailored along these lines has signiªcant potential that 
merits investigation.120 
B. Conceptual  Promise 
Exploration of the developments I have identiªed here also promises 
major conceptual payoffs. First, a successful model of labor law experi-
mentalism may shed new light on democratic experimentalism itself. Rather 
than a single mode of experimentation, my model of labor law experimen-
talism anticipates plural and concurrent forms of experimentation, carried 
out by multiple actors and assessed by multiple decision makers. Thus, 
states, local governments, and private parties are all experimenting, at the 
same time, with how best to structure union organizing and recognition 
processes. Concurrently, workers are looking outside of “labor law” for pro-
tection for their nascent efforts at organization, and are raising another 
set of structural questions and possibilities about labor law’s future. Re-
constructing labor law along experimentalist lines will require attention 
to whether and how such experimental diversity can be incorporated into 
a single experimentalist framework and whether a friendly amendment to 
Dorf and Sabel will be in order. 
Moreover, the experience of the Houston janitors, and the prolifera-
tion of privately negotiated agreements that govern union organizing and 
recognition, are highly relevant to the study of “the private role in public 
governance,” and particularly to the theory of responsive regulation.121 Ian 
Ayres and John Braithwaite, for example, argue that an administrative 
agency can rely on self-regulation and grant regulated entities “the dis-
 
                                                                                                                              
118
 On reciprocity, see, for example, Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, 
Collective Action, and Law, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 71 (2003); Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr & Urs 
Fischbacher, Testing Theories of Fairness—Intentions Matter 6–12 (University of Zurich, 
Working Paper No. 63, 2000). On collective efªcacy, see, for example, Albert Bandura, 
Self Efªcacy 477–84 (1997); Norbert L. Kerr, “Does My Contribution Really Matter?”: 
Efªcacy in Social Dilemmas, 7 Eur. Rev. Soc. Psych. 209 (1996). 
119
 See, e.g., supra note 4. 
120
 I examine this potential in Employment Law as Labor Law, supra note 8.  
121
 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 
(2000); see also Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (1992). 398  Harvard Law & Policy Review  [Vol. 1 
cretion and responsibility . . . to achieve [regulatory] goal[s]” only when 
the government agency possesses a “big gun” of enforcement power—
that is, when the agency has access to extremely powerful sanctions.122 
And yet, while the NLRA stands as the leading example of an agency lack-
ing anything approaching a big gun, successful self-regulation by unions 
and employers is increasingly (and with much apparent success) coming 
to deªne the regime. 
Finally, the Danmar campaign and workers’ use of employment stat-
utes as the legal guardian of their collective action offer insight into a per-
haps even more fundamental query; namely, the compatibility of individ-
ual rights and collective action.123 Proponents of collective action and union-
ism have long looked askance at statutory and judicial protection for the 
individual rights of workers. This skepticism traces back to the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, when courts routinely enjoined union ac-
tivity and invalidated legislation designed to secure workers’ collective 
rights in the name of protecting workers’ individual right to contract.124 In 
the modern era, Nelson Lichtenstein, for example, sees the “discourse of 
‘rights’” as having a “powerfully corrosive impact on the legitimacy of the 
union idea.”125 
The campaign at Danmar and others like it provide a contemporary 
window into the relationship between individual rights and collective action 
and allow us to reexamine whether statutory and judicial protection for 
individual employee rights is in fact inconsistent with the union idea. The 
success of these campaigns gives us some preliminary empirical reasons 
to reject the traditional skepticism. 
More than this, though, the campaigns invite new conceptual inquiry 
into how the protection of individual workplace rights and individual rights 
claimsmaking by workers can facilitate collective action.126 Recent socio-
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logical and social-psychological work on collective action framing127 and 
collective identity formation128 provide important tools to guide this inquiry. 
VI. Conclusion 
There have been numerous calls to reimagine labor law, but we have 
yet to recognize that the raw materials for reinventing the ªeld are avail-
able to us already. The three trends outlined in this Essay provide a rich 
and underutilized source of material for this project. In a series of forth-
coming articles, I intend to explore more fully each of these trends along 
with the structural and theoretical issues they raise about the future of labor 
law. I will also propose an experimentalist model of labor law reform that 
provides a way to involve federal, state, and local governments and private 
actors in a cooperative venture to improve the regime. 
In anticipating this broader project, it is important to observe here that 
although many commentators—and even some labor law scholars—have 
given up on workers’ collective action, a pragmatic assessment of the state 
of the ªeld reveals that the desire for organization and collective interac-
tion is alive and well. Certainly, the particular forms employee organiza-
tion takes, the ways in which workers interact with their employers, and 
the legal channels through which organizing and labor-management ne-
gotiation occur, must all undergo continuing reinvention. But the trends 
outlined in this Essay reveal that even a deeply dysfunctional labor law 
has not suppressed the demand for organization. 
It is my view, moreover, that workers’ collective action, broadly de-
ªned, has multiple virtues that legitimate reinvigorated legal protection.129 
 
                                                                                                                              
127
 See, e.g., Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Move-
ments: An Overview and Assessment, 26 Ann. Rev. Soc. 611, 615 (2000); Nicholas Pedri-
ana, From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes and Transformation of 
the Women’s Movement in the 1960s, 111 Am. J. Soc. 1718, 1719 (2006); David A. Snow, 
et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation, 51 
Am. Soc. Rev. 464 (1986). 
128
 See, e.g., Bert Klandermans & Marga de Weerd, Group Identiªcation and Political 
Protest, in Self, Identity and Social Movements 68 (Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J. Owens 
& Robert W. White, eds., 2000); Bernd Simon, Individuals, Groups, and Social Change: 
On the Relationship Between Individual and Collective Self-Interpretations and Collective 
Action, in Intergroup Cognition and Intergroup Behavior 257 (Constantine Sedikides, 
John Schopler & Chester A. Insko eds., 1998). 
129
 Such a deªnition of workers’ collective action encompasses collaborative endeavors 
intended to achieve workplace “goods” (improvements in wages, beneªts, and working 
conditions, as well as increased voice in the life and governance of the ªrm) that would not 
be achievable through the efforts of individual workers acting alone. As evidenced particu-
larly by my account of the Danmar Finishing campaign, I do not equate workers’ collective 
action with traditional forms of unionism. To the contrary, the term includes collective acts 
far more nascent: pickets, demonstrations, collective protests, and even group demands 
made on an employer. The term, of course, also includes more fully developed organiza-
tional activity, but is broad enough to encompass multiple forms of organization, or what 
Dorothy Sue Cobble calls “unionisms.” See Dorothy Sue Cobble, Lost Ways of Unionism: 
Historical Perspectives on Reinventing the Labor Movement, in Rekindling the Move-400  Harvard Law & Policy Review  [Vol. 1 
Although nothing approaching a full discussion is possible here, when 
workers bargain collectively with their employers, they can achieve wage 
and beneªt gains that have critical redistributive effects.130 In certain set-
tings, organization and collective bargaining also can correct market fail-
ures that inhere in individual employment contracting.131 Developed forms 
of worker organization also have important implications for democracy: 
Successful unions can serve as schools for democratic participation, and 
can give electoral voice to segments of the citizenry that might otherwise 
remain silent.132 
For these reasons, among others, it would be a profound mistake for 
labor law and labor law scholarship to abandon collective action. To the 
contrary, workers’ collective action, in its highly variable incarnations, is 
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